Their preferences also violate an infinitary generalization of Savage's Sure Thing Principle, which we call the *Countable Sure Thing Principle*, as well as an infinitary generalization of von Neumann and Morgenstern's Independence axiom, which we call *Countable (. Petersburg gamble any value that any kind of outcome could possibly have. Rather, such people cannot assign the St. Petersburg paradox are problematic-but not because there is anything wrong with infinite utilities. People with the kind of preferences that give rise to the St. It states that, if we believe that there are some irreducibly normative truths, we are more likely to be believing what we ought to believe compared to not believing that there are such truths, and that this indicates that we ought rationally to believe that there are such truths, justifying the ontological commitment to irreducible normativity in the process. This argument is a version of Pascal’s Wager which I call “Parfit’s Wager,” because it is based on a passage from Derek Parfit’s On What Matters. ) irreducibly normative truths that contains a similar kind of epistemic circularity. This is because the appeal to Ockham’s Razor always contains an intractable element of epistemic circularity and if this circularity is not vicious, we can construct a sound argument for the existence of (. This paper argues that this version of error theory ultimately depends on an appeal to Ockham’s Razor, and that Ockham’s Razor should not be applied to irreducible normativity. One version of moral error theory maintains that the central problem with morality is an ontological commitment to irreducible normativity. All of the consistent views that emerge are very strange. The situation is unstable: plausible general principles tell *against* Fanaticism, but restrictions of those same principles (with strengthened auxiliary assumptions) *support* Fanaticism. In both cases, though, it is possible to rehabilitate arguments for Fanaticism based on restricted versions of those principles. In fact, the general principles that underwrite the arguments (a *separability* principle in the first case, and a *reflection* principle in the second) are *inconsistent* with Fanaticism. While both arguments are instructive, neither is persuasive. I consider two related recent arguments for Fanaticism: Beckstead and Thomas's argument from *strange dependence on space and time*, and (. Should we make significant sacrifices to ever-so-slightly lower the chance of extremely bad outcomes, or to ever-so-slightly raise the chance of extremely good outcomes? *Fanaticism* says yes: for every bad outcome, there is a tiny chance of extreme disaster that is even worse, and for every good outcome, there is a tiny chance of an enormous good that is even better. Introductions to Pascal's wager include Rota 2017 and Hájek 2008. Edited collections on the wager include Jordan 1994 and Bartha & Pasternack 2018. Prominent defenses of Pascal's wager (and responses to objections) include Lycan & Schlesinger 1988, Jordan 2006, Bartha 2007, Monton 2011, Rota 2016 (see also Rota's book, Taking Pascal's Wager, for an extended defense of the wager). Prominent objections to Pascal's wager include Mougin & Sober 1994, Duff 1986, Hájek 2003, and Bostrom 2009. the mixed strategies objection)? Is it possible to believe for a practical reason? Is it rational to believe for a practical reason? Can we interpret "wagering" in terms of something other than belief? the many gods objection)? Does introducing infinities into decision theory give all decisions the same expected value (i.e. In his Pensées, Pascal argues that because “there is an infinitely happy life to gain” and “what you stake is finite," it is practically rational to "wager, then, without hesitation that is" (fragments 233-241). There has been much debate about Pascal's argument since, including: what should we say about the fact that there are multiple religions (i.e. Pascal's wager is one of the most famous.
Practical arguments for theism, by contrast, conclude that we have practical reason(s) to believe in God. Traditional theistic arguments conclude that God exists.
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